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 How does criminal violence affect how citizens evaluate the president? Through 
aggregate- and individual-level analyses of public opinion surveys in Mexico I find that 
criminal violence has a negative effect on approval. Moreover, I find that this effect is 
mediated by two intervening variables: the state of the economy and the spatial distribution 
of crime. Aggregate-level data shows that the negative effect of crime on approval is stronger 
when inflation and unemployment are low, as crime diverts attention from economic 
indicators when the economy is doing well. Meanwhile, individual-level data highlights 
significant spatial heterogeneity within the public when it comes to the salience of public 
security in their evaluations of the president. The findings for Mexico in 2007 and 2008 
suggest that individuals in high violence regions will weigh perceived executive performance 
on security more heavily in their overall assessment of the president. 
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What are the political implications of an increase in criminal violence? Are the effects 
of public security on approval contingent on specific economic conditions? How does the 
uneven spread of violence among regions mediate these effects? In what ways do aggregate- 
and individual-level public opinion studies help us understand these dynamics? Inspired by 
John Mueller’s (1970, 1973) seminal efforts to understand variations in presidential approval, 
political scientists have developed many new theories and methods to examine approval 
trends within and across administrations. When studying approval, however, most of the 
research has focused on economic and foreign policy variables—the “two pillars” of 
approval (Gronke and Newman 2003:508)—and most of this work has been on developed 
countries. There is also little work that bridges individual and aggregate models of approval. 
This thesis addresses some of these gaps in the literature by examining both micro- and 
macro-level models of executive approval in Mexico. 
 Evidence suggests that non-economic issues such as foreign policy, public security 
and corruption can matter as much to the public as the economy in evaluating their presidents 
(Fiorina 1981; Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida 1989; Wilcox and Allsop 1991; Edwards 2005; 
Aldrich et al. 2006).1 These issues can also reduce the salience of the economy in voters’ 
evaluations of government performance (Singer 2011; Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga 
2013). Accordingly, studies have found that the most important factor that guides the weight 
                                                 
1Fiorina (1981:5) notes that in order to estimate their incumbent’s performance, “citizens need only calculate 
the changes in their own welfare. If jobs have been lost in a recession, something is wrong. If sons have died in 
foreign rice paddies, something is wrong If polluters foul food, water, or air, something is wrong.” 
2 
individuals give to issues is the degree to which they consider the issue as being personally 
important (Aldrich and McKelvy 1977; Bizer and Krosnick 2001; Bizer et al. 2004; in Singer 
201:286). Given that in contexts of high violence—such as in Mexico—public security is 
likely to be salient for the public, we would expect that crime can become an important non-
economic issue for voters. 
 The effects of criminal violence on stability, quality of life and economic 
development require us to expand our understanding of how citizens hold elected officials 
accountable on the issue of security.2 This work supports the claim that criminal violence 
matters in presidential approval. However, I argue that the relationship between crime and 
approval is mediated by the shape of the economy and by the spatial distribution of crime. 
More specifically, I make two main claims. First, through an analysis of aggregate-level 
public opinion data in Mexico level I show that although violence has a negative effect on 
approval, this effect is mediated by the state of the economy at a given time. Assuming that 
in good economic times citizens are more likely to shift their attention to non-economic 
issues, I expect rising criminal violence to divert attention from economic indicators when 
the economy is doing well. 
 Second, through an individual-level analysis I show that the effects of crime on 
approval are mediated by the spatial distribution of crime. I consult official data from the 
National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI, in Spanish) in Mexico to score states 
according to their level of criminal violence, and use survey data (BIIACS 2007, 2008) to 
show that perceptions of public security have a significant effect on approval. I argue that 
                                                 
2Accountability in this sense is broadly defined as people’s capacity to reward or punish elected officials 
(Johnson and Schwindt-Bayer 2009; Carlin, Martínez-Gallardo and Hartlyn 2012:204). 
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citizens in high-violence states are likely to evaluate the president by weighing her work on 
security more heavily than other citizens. Conversely, individuals in low-violence states will 
pay less attention to the president’s performance on security when it comes to approval.  
 This essay is organized as follows: Part 1 explores the relationship between crime and 
approval in Mexico at the macro- and micro-levels. In section 1.a. I argue that criminal 
violence should matter for approval given the salience of this issue in countries such as 
Mexico. In section 1.b. and 1.c. I study the effects of the two intervening variables of 
interest—the state of the economy and the spatial distribution of crime—on the relationship 
between crime and approval. Section 1.b. evaluates the effect of unemployment and inflation 
as intervening variables at the aggregate level; while section 1.c. examines the effect of the 
intervening variable regional violence using individual-level data. Part 2 provides 
information on the operationalization of variables used in the analysis, as well as details on 
data access, coding decisions and statistical models. In Part 3, I discuss my results and 
examine the main theoretical implications of these findings, and Part 4 concludes. 
4 
PART 1: THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL VIOLENCE ON APPROVAL 
1.a. Executive approval and public security 
There is extensive research that demonstrates a positive relationship between 
approval and the state of the economy: in general people expect presidents to produce 
favorable economic conditions, and they punish those who fail to do this.3 Yet, we do not 
know much how these indicators interact with other key determinants of interest (Carlin et al. 
2014a). There is also little research on the effect of issues surrounding public security, such 
as crime and natural disasters, on public evaluations of the president. 
There are many reasons why crime would be a salient issue for individuals. In the 
liberal sense, as envisioned by Locke, the main responsibilities of the state are to protect the 
life, liberty, and property of its subjects (Hobbs and Hamerton 2014:28; Ley 2014:69). Given 
the state’s normative duties and resources available to fulfill them, security is considered 
among its most basic functions. Crime also has tangible consequences that make it an 
accessible issue in people’s minds (Ley 2014:68-9).4 Just like the economy, insecurity affects 
people’s prospects of survival and a comfortable life. And even if the consequences are not 
tangible to all, we would expect individuals to magnify negative events when it comes to 
crime, given that highly valued assets are at stake. For instance, evidence suggests that 
                                                 
3Approval ratings measure the percentage of the public that approves of the way politicians handle their jobs. 
These ratings serve as guidelines for parties to understand what constituents are thinking about and how they 
might vote (Berlemann and Enkelmann 2014).  
4Originally, “salience” is used by scholars of voting behavior to designate the importance individual voters 
attach to different issues when evaluating political candidates (e.g., Berelson et al. 1954; in Wleizen 2005:556). 
In this sense, greater salience means greater importance. 
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humans tend to distort objective probabilities of being victims of a criminal act upwards 
(Bazerman 2002), and to overstate the incidence of low probability crimes (Magaloni et al. 
2013:10).5  
Even though security issues only directly affect a small proportion of the population, 
many more citizens are affected indirectly by violence. Criminal violence has tangible effects 
on economic development, human capital and people’s quality of life (Prillaman 2003; 
World Bank 2011; Robles, Magaloni and Calderon 2013). Crime hampers economic growth 
from the victims’ lost wages and labor, by polluting the investment climate, by hurting 
businesses, and by directing scarce government resources to strengthen law enforcement 
rather than promote economic growth (World Bank 2011:4).6 The indirect effects of crime 
are also mediated by the news media7 (Potter 1999; Romer et al. 2003) and by political 
predispositions such as partisanship or ideology (Popkin 1994; Erikson 2009).8  
Violence also weakens key democratic institutions, decreases trust in the criminal 
justice system and the rule of law, and induces public fear (World Bank 2011; Ley 2014). 
Bermeo (1999) argues that high crime is a key determinant that drives voters to support mano 
dura (“iron fist”) leaders whose policies often contribute to democratic backsliding.9 In Latin 
                                                 
5As Magaloni et al. (2013:11) note, for example, people tend to overstate their “objective” probabilities of being 
victims of terrorism or being caught in crossfire between drug gangs (e.g., May et al. 2011). 
6A 2009 study by Alaimo et al. (in World Bank 2011), for example, finds that businesses hit by crime have 
significantly lower sales per worker than those unaffected by criminal activity. 
7The media heightens public concern for crime as it tends to sensationalize it and saturate viewers with crime 
news (Romer et al. 2003; Krause, 2014; 2017:4; see also Ley 2014, Ch. 4). 
8Scholars have noted that security is used readily as a campaign theme, whether driven by actual crime (Wilson 
1975), by voters’ fear of crime affecting them (Scheingold 1984), or by their concerns about crime as a problem 
(Garland 2001; Godoy 2006). Security issues are used even where crime is low (Cullen et al. 1985; Davey 
1999). Voters demand security (Marion and Farmer 2003), and candidates uncover these demands through polls 
(Angell et al. 1996) and public demonstrations about crime (Jimeno 2001; Erikson 2005). Such exposure primes 
voters’ concerns about insecurity (Altheide 2002, in Ley 2017:4; Uang 2013:28). 
9Bermeo’s (1999) shows that those countries with homicide rates averaging 7 per 100,000 inhabitants or above 
experienced some type of backsliding. 
6 
America, this trend is evident through the strengthening of iron fist practices in several 
governments, as was the case during the governments of Alfonso Portillo and Felipe 
Calderon in Mexico (Seligson  2005:227; Gomez Vilchis 2013:34; Ley 2014).  
Given that providing security is among the most basic state functions, that crime has 
tangible consequences for the economy and the lives of citizens, and that in contexts of high 
violence, security issues are consistently emphasized in the public discourse, I expect that: 
• Hypothesis 1: on average, an increase in criminal violence will have a negative 
and statistically significant effect on the approval of a given president 
This expectation makes sense in the context of Latin America, where crime has made 
public security the most significant concern of voters throughout the region (LAPOP 2008, 
2014; Uang 2013). Unlike democracies in the developed world, Latin American countries are 
not characterized by small and diffuse criminal groups outside the state. Rather, violence is 
largely produced by organized criminal groups that often operate in collusion with the 
government (Snyder and Duran-Martínez 2009; Ley 2014; Trejo and Ley 2016; Ley 2017).10 
The relationship between public security and approval, however, is not 
straightforward. Research has noted that responsibility on security issues tends to be 
distributed among different levels of government, and that it traditionally falls in the realm of 
local politics (Romero et al. 2016:103). In Latin American politics, however, the strength of 
the president makes the study of approval even more relevant, as the president is frequently a 
“focal-point of politics” (Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga 2013).11 In the case of Mexico, 
                                                 
10Organized criminal groups are informal associations that operate by illegal means with the primary goal of 
economic gain. Their illegal activities include drug trafficking, smuggling of illegal immigrants, human 
trafficking, arms trafficking, money laundering, extortion, and kidnapping (Ley 2014:14). 
11Scholars have noted that public discontent over presidential performance has even led to occasional early 
departures of presidents in the region (Valenzuela 2004, Perez-Liñán 2007) 
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we know that when insecurity intensifies, the issue tends to escalate to the president’s realm 
(Romero et al. 2016:103). As with foreign policy, terrorism, and war, outcomes with regards 
to public security tend to be viewed by citizens as belonging to the domain of the executive 
(Carlin et al. 2014a; Romero et al. 2016). In general, the public is more likely to hold the 
president responsible for security outcomes (Carlin et al. 2014a:443). 
1.b. Crime, the economy, and approval 
Research in the American and comparative politics subfields has shown that the 
economy is consistently one of the most important factors in public assessments of the 
president (Erikson et al. 2012; Carlin and Hunt 2015). Recessions—such as the one in 
Mexico in 2009—lead to greater coverage of the economy in the news as well as to greater 
public attention to the topic (Harrington 1989; Soroka 2006; Singer 2011). Increased media 
coverage by the media also increases the connection between economic fluctuations and 
presidential approval (Singer 2011:288).  
However, many scholars have noted that in order to analyze the impact of economic 
conditions on approval we must take into account features of the political, institutional and 
social context (Pacek and Radcliff 1995; Palmer and Whitten 1999; Anderson 2000, 2007).12 
The economic voting literature suggests that people will pay less attention to the economy 
when other issues strongly compete for their attention (Singer 2011:290). Meanwhile, 
governance crises involving corruption or terrorist attacks may become more important in 
citizens’ minds than domestic issues (Aldrich et al. 2006).13 However, these crises might also 
become more or less important for the electorate depending on the state of the economy.  
                                                 
12We may also expect that the economic context should matter when studying the impact of crime on approval. 
13As Singer (2011:290) notes: “Overlooked in the economic voting literature . . . is the possibility that 
governance crises such as corruption or protecting human rights may be more important than economic 
concerns” [for example, see Evans and Whitefield 1995]. 
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The economic voting literature presents some key processes from which I draw my 
second hypothesis. First, citizens care about the state of the economy in their assessments of 
the president (Mueller 1973; Erikson et al. 2012). We also know that the multidimensional 
nature of attitude formation and stability makes it likely that the issue of criminal violence 
competes for voters’ limited attention, especially in contexts of high violence (Singer 2011). 
In good economic times, citizens are more likely to shift their attention to non-economic 
issues, and they are likely to shift their attention away from the economy during governance 
crises involving insecurity, corruption, human rights violations, or terrorism (Bali 2007; 
Kibris 2011; Singer 2011). Therefore, I would expect that in periods of economic downturn, 
the negative effect of insecurity on approval will decrease: 
• Hypothesis 2: the effects of criminal violence on the level of executive approval 
will be conditional on the shape of the economy at a given time 
o Hypothesis 2a: as unemployment increases, and the economy diverts attention 
from crime, the negative effect of insecurity on approval will decrease. 
o Hypothesis 2b: similarly, as inflation increases the negative effect of crimes 
on approval will decrease 
Some studies of executive approval focus on the micro-level rather than aggregate 
trends in public opinion. These works have enabled more contextualized understandings of 
changes in presidential approval, and have helped to corroborate findings at the aggregate 
level (Gronke and Newman 2003; Carlin et al. 2012). An aggregate-level approach, in 
contrast, extends basic models built around individual-level arguments to additional case 
studies. As Carlin et al. (2012) suggest, aggregate-level studies generally bear out micro-
level theoretical expectations, even in countries with very different socioeconomic 
9 
backgrounds and democratic histories, including Peru (Arce 2003; Morgan 2003), Uruguay 
(Luna 2002) and in Central America (Cuzan and Bundrick 1997). These studies assume that 
as the environment and circumstances of individuals change, their level of support for the 
president will also change. Aggregation accentuates the orderly movement of macro-
electorates over time, as illustrated by Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson (2002:21): 
One can have an electorate in which large numbers of citizens act as if at random and 
other large numbers have unchanging loyalties that commit them to the same side for 
a lifetime and still observe in the aggregate response an orderly response to real 
political events. When we aggregate over time, those who act as if at random cancel 
out. Those who act always the same produce no variance. The aggregate “signal” 
arises almost wholly from those who are orderly in their behavior. 
1.c. Regional violence, issue salience, and executive performance on security  
Scholars have long debated the relationship between issue salience, attitudes towards 
the president, and ideology at the individual level. There are disagreements among voting 
behavior scholars regarding the effect of issue preferences on how the public assesses 
candidates and establishes political attitudes. On the one hand, Ellis and Stimson (2012) find 
that in the U.S. voters choose among issue preferences somewhat randomly, do not 
understand the implications of issue positions for actual policy outcomes, and make up their 
ideological identity based on symbolic factors.14 Studies of public opinion in the U.S. often 
agree that party identification is the single strongest influence on how the public assesses 
candidates and determines political attitudes (Bartels 2002; Green, Palmquist and Schickler 
2002; Lewis-Beck 2009). For those who identify with a party, partisan cues often take the 
form of well-thought-out issue positions, and attention to news and campaigns, and these 
                                                 
14An example of this is those who identify as Republicans because of the clear religious connotations versus any 
real conservative issue positions (Ellis and Stimson 2012, in Thomas 2016:7). 
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partisans are seen as automatically accepting messages coming from their party while 
rejecting any messages from other parties (Zaller 1996; Goren, Federico and Kittilson 2009). 
On the other hand, the importance of issue salience should not be disregarded so 
easily (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998). Carsey and Layman (2006:464-5) suggest that issue 
attitudes and partisanship can cause changes in each other, but the pattern of influence varies 
systematically: “the degree to which each orientation exerts a causal influence varies 
systematically as a function of the importance individuals attach to an issue and the degree to 
which they are aware of partisan differences on the issue.” In particular, the authors find that 
issue-based change in partisanship should occur among those who are aware of party 
differences on an issue and find that issue to be salient (Carsey and Layman 2006:465).15 
Similarly, evidence also suggests that issues vary in salience over time (Converse 1964), and 
that for an issue to influence approval, the issue must be salient, and people must evaluate the 
president in terms of his performance regarding it (Bernstein 1991; Brody 1991; Edwards 
1991; Edwards, Mitchell and Welch 1995:13).  
Given the geographical dimension of crime, and the fact that criminal violence has 
detrimental effects on the economy and quality of life of citizens, we can assume then that in 
areas disproportionately affected by crime security issues will be of high salience. In other 
words, we would expect that individuals in high-violence regions will attach more weight to 
a president’s performance on security than other citizens in their assessments of the 
president, as these issues become more and more politicized. This is particularly true in 
Mexico during the 2006 presidential election, as the candidates of the main political parties—
Felipe Calderon (PAN), Andres M. Lopez Obrador (PRD) and Roberto Madrazo (PRI)—
                                                 
15In turn, Carsey and Layman (2006) find that individuals who are aware of party differences but do not attach 
importance to the issue evidence party-based—instead of issue-based—-issue change. 
11 
assumed distinctive and identifiable positions on crime during the campaign, increasing the 
ability of citizens to base their opinions of the candidates on issue-based considerations. The 
clearest contrast between these positions was between Calderon and Lopez Obrador, the two 
leading candidates. Calderon campaigned on a “iron fist” position, presenting himself as 
tough enough to crack down on crime, and emphasizing restoring the rule of law in the 
country. Lopez Obrador, in contrast, focused on the need to tackle poverty and enhance 
social welfare to solve crime (Aziz Nassif 2007:26). 
While the hypothesis that party identification drives issue preferences might apply in 
certain contexts, we know that specific issues can shape partisanship, especially if these 
issues are salient and if the candidates assume distinctive positions on crime. In Mexico, 
where violent crime is among the most salient issues,16 individuals should pay closer 
attention to security issues in their assessments of their president. In sum, in high-violence 
regions we would expect that an individual’s issue preference regarding crime might weigh 
more heavily in his assessment of the president than they do among U.S. voters. 
An analysis at the micro-level allows for a more fine-tuned examination of the factors 
that account for variations in approval. In contrast with the macro-level approach and its 
focus on electorates, a micro-level perspective looks at individuals who are assumed to be 
capable of complex, rational judgments given the limited information available (Popkin 
1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Erikson 2009). Indeed, individual-level studies can help 
us isolate variables that shape approval, which aggregate-level studies cannot take into 
account: for instance, micro-level theorizing highlights significant heterogeneity within the 
public, which raises the possibility that variables have different effects on different parts of 
                                                 
16This is evident in all Latinobarometro (2015) surveys for Mexico since 2005, in which the issue of public 
security (delincuencia y seguridad pública) consistently ranks as the most important issue in the country. 
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the population. Individual-level studies can also help to isolate stability and change among 
the public, focusing on who changes and why (Gronke and Newman 2003:506). 
Micro-level studies that examine group differences can point to the sources of those 
differences, and how these differences relate to the realities that various groups experience in 
a society (Newman 2003; Erikson 2009). Scholars have evaluated whether individuals differ 
in the weight they assign to economic fluctuations, directly linking their pocketbooks to the 
national economy (Singer 2011:288). For instance, Weatherford (1983) and Echegaray 
(2005) argue that poor voters should have greater incentives to focus on the state of their 
personal finances than wealthier ones. 
When it comes to criminal violence, group differences can result from differences in 
the weights that each group attaches to variables such as a president’s perceived performance 
on public security (for example, see Gilens 1988; Newman 2003). Given that crime has an 
inherent geographical quality there are good theoretical reasons to study how criminal 
violence can become a salient non-economic issue at the individual level. Evidently, crime 
does not directly affect the whole population in the same way at the same time. Some citizens 
consider public security to be more politically relevant than others, and they will likely 
evaluate the president according to the importance they attach to these issues (Fournier et al. 
2003; Singer 2011). In contrast with high inflation or economic downturn—which have 
society-wide effects—the direct effects of criminal violence are generally concentrated in 
specific regions, cities, and neighborhoods (Romero et al. 2013). Thus, we can expect those 
who live in contexts characterized by very high violence to be more likely to evaluate their 
presidents with this in mind.  
13 
 
To illustrate the relevance of the geographic dimension of crime in Mexico, Figure 1 
shows the average homicide rates of the four least violent and the four most violent states 
from 2000 to 2008. The four least violent states include Aguascalientes, Hidalgo, Queretaro 
and Yucatan, whereas the most violent for that period are Baja California, Chihuahua, 
Guerrero and Sinaloa.17 From the plot, we can see that states with the highest levels of 
                                                 
17Figure 1 plots the highest- and lowest-violence states, which receive a score of nine and one respectively in 
my scale—see Appendix 1 for more details. 
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violence consistently have homicide rates about twice as high as the national average, 
whereas low-violence states have homicide rates that are comparable to that of developed 
countries in Western Europe. The sharp increase in homicide rates for high-violence states 
from 2007 can be attributed to a surge in violence in areas bordering the U.S. and in states 
such as Michoacán, Sinaloa and Durango. The main agents of violence in these states are 
criminal organizations, especially those involved in drug trafficking.18 These states are also 
characterized by a weak presence of the state: policing is often absent, the criminal justice 
system is ineffective, and communities lack basic health and education services. 
                                                 
18The violence produced by drug-trafficking organizations is often fueled by drug-trafficking related activities, 
which lead to conflict among drug cartels and between cartels and the state (Ley 2014:14). 
15 
 Even though we can discern a stable pattern in the average homicide rates for all 
states before 2007, this stability disguises notable variations within the groups. Among those 
with the highest homicide rates, for example, states such as Guerrero and Oaxaca are 
characterized by rural forms of violence.19 Historically, a large proportion of homicides in 
these states predominantly comes in the form of extra-judicial killings, domestic violence, 
and executions associated with land disputes (Taylor, 1979, Escalante 2009). Rural violence 
is generally not associated with organized criminal organizations, and it predominantly takes 
place in municipalities with less than 10,000 inhabitants (Escalante 2009). As it is evident in 
Figure 2, states with predominantly rural forms of violence—mainly located in southern 
Mexico, around the Tierra Caliente region—have seen homicide rates drop dramatically from 
2000 to 2008 and stabilize after that. On average, homicide rates in these states dropped from 
over 30 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2000 to about 15 in 2008.20  
To summarize, criminal violence has been highly concentrated in a few Mexican 
states over the last decades—particularly in rural states as well as those near the US border. 
If public security issues are more salient for citizens in high-violence regions, then public 
security can stand on its own as a potential non-economic issue on which citizens might base 
their evaluations of the president. In this context, an individual’s perception of crime and her 
attitudes towards the president’s performance on security will be reflected in that person’s 
overall assessment of the president. From this, we can hypothesize that in states with high 
level of criminal violence citizens will pay closer attention to the way politicians are handling 
                                                 
19About a quarter of the total homicides in Mexico from the 1980s until the turn of the century occurred in one 
of these three states, in mostly rural municipalities. 
20To illustrate the decrease in rural forms of violence, in 2000 Oaxaca—a state historically characterized by 
high levels of rural violence—recorded 54 homicides per 100,000 population, the highest murder rate of any 
state that year. By 2008, the rate had dropped significantly (to 17.8) but remained above the national average. 
16 
public security, and they will likely base their evaluations of the executive with this in mind. 
This analysis translates to the following hypotheses: 
• Hypothesis 3: citizens in high violence states are more likely to pay closer 
attention to the way the president is handling public security, and this will weigh 
more heavily in their assessment of the president 
The underlying assumption here is that people attach varying degrees of importance 
to the issue of security depending on the levels of violence in their states. Ideally, we would 
evaluate the effects of high violence contexts on approval at the municipality or even 
neighborhood levels, as this would allow us to more precisely measure the extent to which 
the violence in a community shapes public perceptions of politicians. Unfortunately, 
however, the national survey data obtained for this analysis does not contain data on the 
municipality or neighborhood of residence of participants.  
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PART 2: METHODS, DATA AND MODELS 
 
To test Hypotheses 1, 2.a and 2.b, I use aggregate public opinion data in Mexico from 
2003 to 2015 (Carlin et al. 2016).21 To test hypotheses 3.a and 3.b I use individual survey 
data obtained from the Banco de Información para la Investigación Aplicada en Ciencias 
Sociales (BIIACS) and designed by the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas 
(CIDE) in Mexico. The two surveys were conducted in November 2007 and October 2008 
during the presidency of Felipe Calderon (2006-2012),22 who made the issue of public 
security a central element of his campaign (Norzagaray López 2010; Bravo Regidor 2011) 
and his presidency (Ley 2014). Calderon declared “war on crime” on drug cartels soon after 
assuming power in 2006 (Parish Flannery 2013), increasing active federal government 
intervention on security. In consequence, criminal violence skyrocketed: Mexico went from 
10 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants at the beginning of Calderon’s term to about 30 per 
100,000 at the peak of violence in the summer of 2011 (Magaloni et al. 2013; Ley 2014).  
2.a. Aggregate-level public opinion models  
2.a.(i). Dependent variable—executive approval 
Studying the relationship between approval, security and the economy in Latin 
America has been difficult since most of the surveys that deal with approval are inconsistent 
                                                 
21The period under study corresponds to the rise of criminal violence in several regions in Mexico. Inter-cartel 
war flared up at the turn of the century, and competition over traffic routes into the U.S. became more intense 
after Calderon declared a war against drugs and cartels in 2006 (Grillo 2011; Ley 2014). 
22The sample frame for these surveys selected households through a multi-stage stratified probabilistic process. 
Household interviews lasted approximately 40 minutes each and were completed by an adult member, randomly 
selected, with a similar proportion of male and female interviewees (BIIACS 2007, 2008). 
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and often unavailable across time. This, along with differences in questionnaire design, data 
collection process, length of time series, sampling frame and missing data, have frustrated 
attempts to understand patterns of approval (Carlin et al. 2014:115). Following Erikson, 
MacKuen and Stimson’s (2002) empirical strategy, Carlin, Hartlyn, Love and Martinez-
Gallardo (2016) have put together the Executive Approval Database (EAD), which combines 
thousands of available approval surveys for Latin American countries into “smoothed” 
monthly time series that are comparable across time and countries.23 I derive my dependent 
variable from the EAD from January 2003 to June 2015, and it measures the percentage of 
people who say they “approve” of the way the president is handling the job.  
Approval moves as a stationary distributed lag time series, which is found to be a 
well-behaved time-series.24 As a distributed lag process, I model current approval as a 
function of approval from the previous month (t − 1) (Carlin and Hunt 2015:82). The theory 
behind the models is that the level of support for the president will remain constant unless a 
significant political or economic change causes the level of support to rise or fall. That is, last 
month’s level of support for the president predicts this month’s level. If the economy is doing 
well, support for the president should increase; if not, we would expect people to express 
their discontent in lower levels of support (Erikson et al. 2002). Therefore, my models 
studying approval at the aggregate-level in Mexico include a lagged version of executive 
approval (Approval at t − 1) as an independent variable.  
                                                 
23Their approach relies on country-specific measurement models derived from Erikson et al.’s (2002) dyad-
ratios algorithm. The measure of approval for each country in the EAD uses all such dyadic ratios within a 
given series to estimate presidential approval values at monthly intervals. Exponential smoothing on the series 
“sharpens the estimates by removing random fluctuation due to sampling error.” (Carlin et al. 2014b:115). This 
method assumes that to the extent that a given data time series is a valid indicator of presidential approval, the 
ratio of any two values within the series is a relative indicator of presidential approval (Carlin et al. 2014b, 115). 
24Erikson et al. (2002:35) argue that as a stationary series, approval can be moved by the events and conditions 
of a presidency, but tends to return to a stable mean as these effects recede in time. 
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The EAD series measure presidential approval (aprueba/desaprueba), favorability 
(favorable/desfavorable), and ratings (bien, regular, mal) of the president’s management 
(gestión), job (trabajo), performance (desempeño), and image (imagen) (Carlin et al. 
2014a:446). In this study I use the marginal of the positive response, which is a useful 
method to consistently estimate approval if the response choice in the surveys is 
dichotomous, trichotomous (with a “regular” or neutral middle category), and even if it has 
four response choices (where the marginal includes all positive responses).25  
 
 
Moreover, as Figure 3 and Table 1 show, executive approval rates vary widely in the 
period covered, from a low of 43.64% for Enrique Peña Nieto in March 2015, to a high of 
                                                 
25As Erikson et al. (2002:43) explain, the marginal total is “all but uninterpretable in isolation,” but this is not an 
issue when we study opinion change over time–“as part of a series ordered in time, the simple [marginal] is a 
datum. If it is higher or lower than readings before and after or even if it is the same, it says something about the 
time in which the survey was taken.” 
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69.11% for Felipe Calderon in July 2007. We can also identify from Figure 3 that there is 
substantial variation among and within presidential terms, and that the approval rate of the 
three presidents covered in the 2003-2015 period is high (mean= 56.99%, s.d.= 5.78) even 
relative to other Latin American countries. 
2.a.(ii). Independent and control variables 
 
In the aggregate model, I measure criminal violence using the number of homicides 
as my key explanatory variable of interest.26 From Table 2 we can observe that the number of 
homicides in this period shows wide variation. There were 508 recorded homicides in 
February 2007 (the lowest in the time covered), shortly after Calderon’s drug on war began. 
In May 2011—at the height of the war on drugs—there were 2601 recorded homicides, as 
violence intensified between government forces and drug cartels, as well as between cartels. 
Table 2 also shows that the number of monthly homicides in this period is relatively high 
(mean= 14.22%) and with high variation (s.d.= 5.92). 
Regarding the relationship between approval and the economy, there has been much 
debate in the economic voting literature about which economic indicators citizens are most 
likely to feel, and which changes in the economy will most consistently affect their vote 
(Carlin et al. 2014a:117). In comparative analysis, the researcher has to devise appropriate 
                                                 
26Of all violent crimes, homicide can attract large and heterogeneous audiences, and it is generally unanimously 
condemned even by those who favor the death penalty (Piccato 2008:61). 
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measures that equate economic conditions across countries and time. Scholars have theorized 
that approval varies systematically with inflation (Johnson and Schwindt-Bayer 2009; Powell 
and Whitten 1999), and unemployment (Cuzan and Bundrick 1997; Carlin et al. 2014a; 
Carlin and Hunt 2015). Here I operationalize economic conditions using indicators for 
unemployment and inflation with monthly data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y 
Geografía (INEGI) in Mexico.  
Unemployment indicates the share of the labor force that is without work but seeking 
employment. Inflation reflects the annual percentage change in the cost of acquiring goods 
and services to the average consumer, and it is measured by changes in the consumer price 
index (CPI). Unemployment and inflation are ideal indicators of the economic conditions of 
Mexico because data is available for the entire period covered in this study (from January 
2003 to June 2015). From Table 2 we can see that unemployment rates vary widely during 
the 13 year period in the dataset, from a low of 2.77% in December 2005—during the 
presidency of Vicente Fox—to a high of 6.42% in September 2009—as the country faced 
“the worst year of economic downturn” since the offset of the Great Depression.27 However, 
we should note that inflation rates remained relatively stable (s.d.= 0.35) and low (mean= 
0.33%) during this time, even during the economic crisis. Given that there is little variation in 
this explanatory variable we will likely observe null effects of inflation on approval in our 
models. Similarly, it is likely that our interaction term in Hypothesis 2.b. will yield null 
results. 
                                                 




Moreover, research on executive approval in the US finds that presidents generally go 
through a “honeymoon” period, with initially higher than average approval rates that decline 
over time.28 To account for the effect of honeymoons, the model includes a dummy variable 
(see Table 3) to denote the first six months during a president’s term where she experiences 
higher rates of political support. In total, there were a number of 12 honeymoon months in 
this sample, six months for both Calderon and Peña Nieto’s terms. For more information on 
data access and coding decisions for all the variables in the aggregate-level model see 
Appendix 3. 
2.a.(iii). Statistical model  
Similar to the approach of other scholars (e.g., see Erikson, Stimson and MacKuen 
2002; and more recently Carlin and Hunt 2015), I model monthly time series of approval as a 
function of the lag Approval29 and of current values of the independent variables of interest. 
According to Carlin and Hunt (2015), a distributed lag model requires us to include only 
current values of the explanatory variables, given that the lagged values of the dependent 
variable capture the effects of the independent variables in past months. The coefficients 
reported, therefore, indicate the effects of current values of the economic variables on current 
                                                 
28Some theories for why the honeymoon period erodes over time include the fact that voters might become 
“disillusioned” as the president’s promises go unfulfilled (Stimson 1991); and, as Brody’s (1991) “elite 
leadership” theory puts forward, “a president’s honeymoon popularity represents an artificially high starting 
point at the outset, rather than a natural base of support.” It is not surprising that presidents start out with “an 
aura of goodwill” that is even shared by supporters of the defeated opponent (Erikson et al. 2002:36). 
29 At month t – 1. 
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(time t) values of Approval while controlling for lagged (t − 1) Approval (Carlin and Hunt 
2015:82). The model controls for a six-month honeymoon at the beginning of each 
presidential term covered (Calderon and Peña Nieto) to account for the boost in popularity 
presidents get at the beginning of their mandate.  
I test the relationship between criminal violence and executive approval (Hypothesis 
1) using a simple distributed lag model (Model 1), in which I control for the economic 
indicators of interest as well as honeymoons. This model also includes the interactions 
Homicides ∗ Inflation and Homicides ∗ Unemployment, which allow us to test the claim that 
the effects of homicides on approval are conditional on the shape of the economy at a given 
time (Hypotheses 2a and 2b). This model is expressed as follows: 
Model 1: Approval t = α + Approval (t−1) β1 + Homicide t β2 + Unemployment t β3 + 
Inflation t β4 + Honeymoon t β5 + Homicides∗Unempl t β6 + Homicides ∗ Inflation t β7 + ε 
2.b. Individual-level public opinion models 
2.b.(i). Dependent variable—executive approval  
The dependent variable in the individual-level analysis—also executive approval—is 
drawn from the BIIACS national surveys. The first field survey from which this study draws 
was conducted in all Mexican states on November 30, 2007, and it has a sample size of 
18812. The second BIIACS survey was conducted on October 24, 2008, and has a sample 
size of 7200. Approval is derived from responses to the survey question “To what extent do 
you approve of the way in which President Calderon is doing his job.” Approval, in this case, 
is measured using one of five categories, which range from strongly approves (aprueba 
mucho) to strongly disapproves (desaprueba mucho).  
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Note that the 2007 BIIACS survey does not cover six states nor the Distrito Federal.30 
Of these, two states—Guerrero and Michoacán—stand out in terms of criminal violence, as 
their homicide rate during the 2000-2008 period is more than double the national homicide 
rate. The remaining states not covered by this survey had homicide rates below (e.g., 
Campeche, Baja California Sur) the national average during this period.  
2.b.(ii). Independent and control variables  
The first key independent variable is regional violence, a categorical variable that 
captures the level of criminal violence by region in Mexico.31 Two other independent 
variables of interest include the degree to which respondents approve of Calderon’s work on 
security (evalseg) and on the economy (evalecon).32 In Model 3, these variables are used to 
estimate the degree to which a citizen’s perceptions of the executive’s work on security and 
the economy affect her overall evaluation of the president. 
                                                 
30See Appendix 2 for more information on the states included in each of the BIIACS surveys as well as the 
number of cases in each state. 
31For more information about the coding of this variable as well as the specific states included in each category 
(ranging from 1—lowest violence states—to 9—highest violence states), see Appendix 1. 
32These variables are obtained from the survey questions “Do you approve or disapprove of the work of Felipe 
Calderon on his handling of security?” (evalseg) and “Do you approve or disapprove of the work of Felipe 
Calderon on his handling of the economy?” (evalecon). Coding details in Table Appendix 3. 
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In this model, I control for whether respondents share party identification with the 
president using the dummy variable Party ID (partyID of 1 = respondent supports the PAN—
Partido de Acción Nacional). The model also controls for the gender, age and level of 
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education of participants. Additional information on data access and the coding of variables 
in the individual-level models see Appendix 3. 
2.b.(iii). Statistical model 
 
The ordered categorical model (Model 2) can be understood by generalizing the latent 
variable formulation to K categories, where y is the unobserved dependent variable 
(approval), x is a vector of independent and control variables, β an unknown parameter 
vector, c represents the thresholds or cut points, and ε the error term. The objective of Model 
2, then, is to predict the likelihood that y∗ is within one of five categories of approval, ranging 
from Strongly Disapproves (Category 1) to Strongly Approves (Category 5). This ordered 
logit model allows us to derive a likelihood function and maximum likelihood estimates of β 
for the explanatory variables of interest. From this model, we obtain odds ratios for each of 
the explanatory variables of interest, as well as a marginal effects plot for the interaction term 
regviolence*evalseg.
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PART 3: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
3.a. Results of the aggregate-level model 
 
The results for the distributed lag model are reported in Table 7. In line with my 
theoretical expectations (Hypothesis 1), the results show that the number of homicides has a 
negative and significant effect on approval—all else equal, an increase in 100 homicides in 
one month will translate to a loss of 0.51% in approval for the president, on average. The 
negative and significant effect of the economic variable unemployment also follows our 
expectations: for an increase of one percentage point in unemployment we would expect, on 
average, a decrease of 1.71% in the approval of the president at a given time. 
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The findings suggest that neither inflation nor honeymoon has a significant effect on 
approval. With regards to inflation, this could be attributed to the fact that inflation in Mexico 
showed little variation (mean= 0.33%; s.d.= 0.35) in the time covered, even during the 
financial crisis in 2009. Similarly, the null effects of honeymoon might come from 
insufficient honeymoon months in the time series, which only covered the beginning of two 
presidential terms—only twelve months in a time series with a length of 155. 
 
Model 1 also suggests that there is a significant interactive effect between the 
variables unemployment and homicides on approval. To better understand the magnitude and 
direction of the of this interaction Figure 4 plots the marginal effects of homicides on 
approval across all observed values of unemployment and inflation. The graph on the left 
shows that when unemployment is high, the negative effect of homicides on approval will be 
weak compared to lower values of unemployment. This is statistically different from zero 
across all observed values of unemployment, but the negative effect is stronger when 
unemployment is low. This finding supports hypothesis 2.a: On average, an increase in 
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criminal violence has a negative and significant effect on the approval of presidents when 
unemployment is low. However, we do not find support for Hypothesis 2.b. on the interactive 
effect between inflation and homicides. 
A key shortcoming with Model 1, which is a challenge faced by macro-level analyses 
of public opinion in general, is that exclusive reliance on aggregate data—such as homicides 
or unemployment rates—takes us only part of the way toward answering questions about 
how individuals react to changing circumstances, or why people evaluate the president as 
they do. As Edwards, Mitchell and Welch (1995:109) explain, aggregate level data do not 
provide information about individual behavior, and findings of covariation in this research 
often raises the question of “who is responding and for what reasons?” For example, if a drop 
in presidential approval coincides with an increase in the homicide rates, is this the result of 
increased discontent among those directly affected by criminal violence, those worried about 
crime more generally, or those not directly affected by crime but who feel the president is not 
doing enough to combat crime in places most affected? 
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3.b. Results of the individual-level model 
 
The results in Table 8 correspond to the odds ratios from the ordered logit models for 
the effect of our independent variables on approval in the two BIIACS surveys.33 As 
expected, more positive perceptions of a president’s work on security or the economy will, 
on average, translate to a higher likelihood that a citizen approves of the president. More 
                                                 
33The table reports the odds ratios as these are easier to interpret. See Appendix 4 for the coefficients for the 
ordered logit models. 
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specifically, these results suggest that keeping all other variables constant, when a person’s 
perception of the president’s performance on security increases by one category, she will be 
1.4 (in 2007) and 1.8 (in 2008) times more likely to be in a higher category of approval. 
Similarly, an increase in perceptions of the president’s performance on the economy will 
make someone, on average, 2.156 (in 2007) or 1.379 (in 2008) times more likely to be in a 
higher category of approval. These findings support the broader claim that the salience of 
criminal violence is not a constant but varies across individuals in different states. 
Interestingly, the effects of perceptions of a president’s economic performance on 
approval are considerably stronger in the 2007 survey than in 2008, while the effects of the 
perceptions of security performance on approval are weaker in 2007. This could be attributed 
to the fact that in October 2008—when Survey 2 was conducted—Calderon’s war on drugs 
had turned into a bloody and intense conflict, which helped create a “culture of fear” among 
the public (Escalante 2009; Hernandez 2012; Ley 2014).34 As Calderon’s war intensified and 
its effects became more noticeable to the public, we could think that citizens attached more 
weight to the president’s performance on security issues—relative to the weight attached to 
performance on the economy—in their evaluations of the executive.  
From Table 8 we can also note that an increase in one unit in the level of violence in a 
person’s state would make that person 4.2% (in 2007) or 0.7% (in 2008) more likely to move 
to a lower category in approval (e.g. from somewhat approves to neither approves nor 
disapproves), on average. The negative effect of regional violence on approval could be 
attributed to the possibility that citizens in high violence states might have higher 
                                                 
34In fact, the number of homicides almost doubled between the time both surveys were conducted—from a 
national average of 7 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in November 2007 to an unprecedented homicide rate 
of 14.6 a year later. 
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expectations of their president on security issues, which they are likely to prioritize over 
others. If this is true, we would expect those who live in more violent regions to weigh 
perceived performance on security more heavily in their overall assessment of the president. 
 
To test this, Figure 5 plots the marginal effects of perceived security performance on 
approval across all values of regional violence for the two BIIACS surveys. These plots show 
that the for those in more dangerous states, perceptions of executive performance on security 
seem to matter more when it comes to evaluating the president’s overall performance. 
Conversely, those in less dangerous states will weigh the executive’s work on security less 
heavily in their evaluations of the president. Interestingly, for the 2008 survey we can see 
that the effects of security performance increase even more sharply as the region’s level of 
violence increases. Once again, this could be attributed to the high intensity of Calderon’s 
war on drugs when the survey was conducted; and because in high-violence states—such as 
Sinaloa, Guerrero and Chihuahua—the number of homicides grew dramatically by 2008. 
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PART 4: CONCLUSION 
What are some of the factors that help us understand whether citizens approve of the 
work of their president? Inspired by research methods and theoretical insights from public 
opinion studies in the U.S. and in Latin America, this paper finds that executive approval in 
the Mexican context appears to be subject to similar economic forces as in the United States. 
In particular, my aggregate analysis provides evidence that the economy and criminal 
violence are both significant predictors for approval in Mexico for the 2003-2015 period. 
Interestingly, the results for one of my economic indicators—inflation—did not go along the 
theoretical expectations. This result could be attributed to the fact that there is little variation 
in the inflation rate during the period under examination (the highest inflation rate being 
2.52% and the lowest -0.74%, with a standard deviation of 0.46). Since inflation was not a 
problem even during Mexico’s economic crisis in 2009, this issue was not in the public 
discussion and, thus, it was likely not in the minds of citizens. 
The results from the individual-level models corroborate the hypothesis that crime 
matters for executive approval, and they also provide additional insights on the way the 
public evaluates the president’s performance on public security. As it turns out, evidence 
suggests that citizens in high violence contexts will weigh the issue of public security more 
heavily than others when it comes to evaluating the executive, and this interactive effect 
seems to intensify in the middle of a security crisis. It is also important to note that 
perceptions of the president’s performance on the economy are also strong and significant 
predictors of their likelihood to approve of the president’s work. Beyond corroborating 
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aggregate-level findings, the micro-level models are also helpful as they allow us to account 
for key factors that affect approval and which aggregate studies cannot isolate. For example, 
these models enable us to take political predispositions like partisanship as well as social and 
demographic factors—such as education, gender and age—into account in our study. 
In terms of empirical contributions, this study responds to calls to “compare and 
bridge individual and aggregate models of approval” (Gronke and Newman 2003:506). 
Although studying approval at the micro-level is quite different from the aggregate, 
discovering that individual-level analyses corroborate the findings of macro-level studies 
lends credibility to the results on the effects of criminal violence on approval. On the one 
hand, our aggregate analysis allows us to discern the long-term effects of security on the level 
of executive approval across several presidential terms. On the other hand, our individual-
level models highlight significant heterogeneity within the public that can be attributed to the 
geographical dimension of violence. This reflects the theoretical expectation that some 
variables—such as public perceptions of how the president handles public security—have 
different effects on different segments of the population. 
Another advantage of micro-level data is that it allows us to examine the effect of 
individual perceptions of a president’s performance, which might play a more significant 
impact on approval than actual outcomes. Edwards (1983), for instance, found that 
evaluations of a president’s handling of economic policy had a greater impact on overall 
presidential approval than indicators of personal economic circumstances or evaluations of 
the economy’s general performance. Reality could very well affect perceptions, but it is those 
perceptions, mediated by party, personal history, education, and any other factors that 
ultimately shape how someone evaluates the executive’s performance in an issue area 
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(Jordan 1993). As Edwards et al. (1995:114) nicely put it: “Knowing how the public 
evaluates the president’s performance on an issue provides us a more direct and theoretically 
meaningful measure of a person’s thinking on the issue than what might be termed more 
objective measures of the issue.” 
Overall, this work contributes to a growing literature on executive approval in Latin 
America, as well as to efforts to explore how the public holds politicians accountable for 
security issues. In a nutshell, the study makes several theoretical contributions. First, it 
provides micro- and macro-level evidence for the effect of criminal violence on approval: in 
general, citizens punish presidents’ approval for higher homicide rates, and they will reward 
them as they create more jobs. Second, the models identify similarities among the factors that 
shape presidential approval between the American and Mexican electorates: most notably, 
that the shape of the economy—in terms of unemployment rates, at least—and public 
perceptions of a president’s performance on the economy also matter in approval. Third, the 
findings also support Matthew Singer’s (2011) expectations that during good economic times 
citizens are more likely to shift their attention to non-economic issues such as public security. 
Fourth, the results highlight that in order to evaluate the effects of violence on approval we 
should pay close attention to the way in which different groups in the population are affected 
by issues of varying salience, such as criminal violence. 
In terms of the quality of democracy, the repercussions of an upsurge in criminal 
violence and the rising popular concerns with security in Mexico, as well as in Latin 
America, remain to be seen. Bermeo (1999) argues that high crime played a key role in the 
breakdown of democracy in inter-war Europe—and this was more important than economic 
crises, and other variables often used to account for the rise of authoritarianism. With some 
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exceptions—such as the election of Otto Perez Molina in Guatemala in 2011—evidence 
suggests that Latin America’s crime wave has not led to the breakdown of democracy in the 
region as predicted by Bermeo (Weyland 2003; Ley 2014 ch.4). Nevertheless, we ought to 
note that public support for democracy in Latin America has waned, as the region continues 
to struggle with high income inequality, poverty, corruption, and some of the highest 
homicide rates in the world (e.g., see Weyland 2003; Mainwaring and Perez-Liñán 2005; 
Krause 2014; Huber 2017). In this, citizens’ growing concern with crime might press 
governments in the region to adopt a more mano dura approach, or to justify a shift to 
authoritarian practices in order to enhance security. Public frustration caused by the inability 
of governments to provide security could also lead to the rise of right-wing populist leaders 
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